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The so called “globalization” process (i.e. the inexorable integration of markets, currencies,
nation-states, technologies and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole) has
a behavior exactly equivalent to a system that is tending to a maximum entropy state. This
globalization process obeys a collective welfare principle in where the maximum payoff is given by
the equilibrium of the system and its stability by the maximization of the welfare of the collective
besides the individual welfare. This let us predict the apparition of big common markets and strong
common currencies. They will reach the “equilibrium” by decreasing its number until they reach a
state characterized by only one common currency and only one big common community around the
world.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent works [1–7] the relationships between quan-
tum mechanics and game theory were analyzed. Starting
from the fact that a physical system is modeled through
quantum mechanics (and/or physics) and a socioeconom-
ical one through evolutionary game theory was shown
how although both systems are described through two
theories apparently different both are analogous and thus
exactly equivalents.
That produced interesting results (like the quantum
analogue of the replicator dynamics, the quantization re-
lationships for classical systems, the quantum games en-
tropies, the thermodynamical temperature of a socioeco-
nomical system, the collective welfare principle and the
quantum understanding of classical systems) and strange
interesting consequences like the analyzed in the follow-
ing research.
The so called “globalization” process (i.e. the inex-
orable integration of markets, currencies, nation-states,
technologies and the intensification of consciousness of
the world as a whole) has a behavior exactly equivalent
to a system that is tending to a maximum entropy state.
This globalization process obeys a collective welfare
principle in where the maximum payoff is given by the
equilibrium of the system and its stability by the max-
imization of the welfare of the collective over the indi-
vidual welfare. This let us predict the apparition of big
common markets and strong common currencies. They
will reach the “equilibrium” by decreasing its number
until they get a state characterized by only one common
currency and only one big common community around
the world.
II. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN QUANTUM
MECHANICS & GAME THEORY
The clear resemblances and apparent differences be-
tween both theories and between the properties both en-
joy were a motivation to try to find an actual relationship
between both systems. In the next table we compare
some characteristic aspects of quantum mechanics and
game theory.
Table 1
Quantum Mechanics Game Theory
n system members n players
Quantum States Strategies
Density Operator Relative Frequencies Vector
Von Neumann Equation Replicator Dynamics
Von Neumann Entropy Shannon Entropy
System Equilibrium Payoff
Maximum Entropy Maximum Payoff
To find an actual relationship between quantum me-
chanics and game theory lets analyze more deeply both
systems.
A. Quantum Statistical Mechanics
& the von Neumann Equation
1. Description of a Physical System
A physical system is described through a Hilbert space
where a state of that system is described through a state
vector (element of that Hilbert space) |Ψ(t)〉 which is pos-
tulated that contains all the information of the system.
An ensemble is a collection of identically prepared physi-
cal systems. When each member of the ensemble is char-
acterized by the same state vector |Ψ(t)〉 it is called pure
2ensemble. If each member has a probability pi of being in
the state |Ψi(t)〉 we have a mixed ensemble. Each mem-
ber of a mixed ensemble is a pure state and its evolution
is given by Schro¨dinger equation. To describe correctly a
statistical mixture of states it is necessary the introduc-
tion of the density operator ρ(t) =
∑n
i=1 pi |Ψi(t)〉 〈Ψi(t)|
which can be expressed in matrix form. The density op-
erator contains all the physically significant information
we can obtain about the ensemble in question. Any two
ensembles that produce the same density operator are
physically indistinguishable. The diagonal elements ρnn
of the matrix which represents the density operator ρ(t)
represents the average probability of finding the system
in the state |n〉 and its sum is equal to 1. The non-
diagonal elements ρnp expresses the interference effects
between the states |n〉 and |p〉 which can appear when
the state |Ψi〉 is a coherent linear superposition of these
states.
2. Evolution of a Physical System
The time evolution of the density operator is given by
the von Neumann equation
i~
dρ
dt
=
[
Hˆ, ρ
]
, (1)
where Hˆ is the Hamiltonian of the physical system. The
von Neumann equation is only a generalization (and/or a
matrix-operator representation) of the Schro¨dinger equa-
tion and the quantum analogue of Liouville’s theorem
from classical statistical mechanics.
B. Evolutionary Game Theory
& the Replicator Dynamics
1. Description of a Socioeconomical System
& the Notions of Equilibrium
Game theory [8–10] is the study of decision making
of competing agents in some conflict situation. It tries
to understand the birth and the development of conflict-
ing or cooperative behaviors among a group of individu-
als who behave rationally and strategically according to
their personal interests. Each member in the group strive
to maximize its welfare by choosing the best courses of
strategies from a cooperative or individual point of view.
Evolutionary game theory [11–13] does not rely on ra-
tional assumptions but on the idea that the Darwinian
process of natural selection [14] drives organisms towards
the optimization of reproductive success [15]. Instead
of working out the optimal strategy, the different phe-
notypes in a population are associated with the basic
strategies that are shaped by trial and error by a pro-
cess of natural selection or learning. The natural se-
lection process that determines how populations playing
specific strategies evolve is known as the replicator dy-
namics [12, 13, 16, 17] whose stable fixed points are Nash
Equilibria (NE) [9]. The central equilibrium concept of
evolutionary game theory is the notion of Evolutionary
Stable Strategy (ESS) introduced by J. Smith and G.
Price [11, 18]. An ESS is described as a strategy which
has the property that if all the members of a population
adopt it, no mutant strategy could invade the population
under the influence of natural selection. ESS are inter-
preted as stable results of processes of natural selection.
Quantum games have proposed a new point of view
for the solution of the classical problems and dilemmas
in game theory. Quantum games are more efficient than
classical games and provide a saturated upper bound for
this efficiency [19–24].
A Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies, one for each
player, such that no player has an incentive to unilat-
erally change his action. Players are in equilibrium if a
change in strategies by any one of them would lead that
player to earn less than if he remained with his current
strategy. A Nash equilibrium satisfies the following con-
dition
E(p, p) ≥ E(r, p), (2)
whereE(si, sj) is a real number that represents the payoff
obtained by a player who plays the strategy si against
an opponent who plays the strategy sj . A player can not
increase his payoff if he decides to play the strategy r
instead of p.
Consider a large population in which a two person
game G = (S,E) is played by randomly matched pairs of
animals generation after generation. Let p be the strat-
egy played by the vast majority of the population, and let
r be the strategy of a mutant present in small frequency.
Both p and r can be pure or mixed. An evolutionary
stable strategy (ESS) p of a symmetric two-person game
G = (S,E) is a pure or mixed strategy for G which sat-
isfies the following two conditions
E(p, p) > E(r, p),
If E(p, p) = E(r, p) then E(p, r) > E(r, r). (3)
Since the stability condition only concerns to alternative
best replies, p is always evolutionarily stable if (p, p) is
a strict equilibrium point. An ESS is also a Nash equi-
librium since is the best reply to itself and the game is
symmetric. The set of all the strategies that are ESS
is a subset of the NE of the game. A population which
plays an ESS can withstand an invasion by a small group
of mutants playing a different strategy. It means that if
a few individuals which play a different strategy are in-
troduced into a population in an ESS, the evolutionarily
selection process would eventually eliminate the invaders.
2. Evolution of a Socioeconomical System
Each agent in a n-player game where the ith player has
as strategy space Si is modeled by a population of players
3which have to be partitioned into groups. Individuals in
the same group would all play the same strategy. Ran-
domly we make play the members of the subpopulations
against each other. The subpopulations that perform the
best will grow and those that do not will shrink and even-
tually will vanish. The natural selection process assures
survival of the best players at the expense of the others.
The natural selection process that determines how popu-
lations playing specific strategies evolve is known as the
replicator dynamics
dxi
dt
= [fi(x)− 〈f(x)〉]xi. (4)
The probability of playing certain strategy or the relative
frequency of individuals using that strategy is denoted
by frequency xi. The fitness function fi =
∑n
j=1 aijxj
specifies how successful each subpopulation is, 〈f(x)〉 =∑n
k,l=1 aklxkxl is the average fitness of the population,
and aij are the elements of the payoff matrix A
dxi
dt
=

 n∑
j=1
aijxj −
n∑
k,l=1
aklxkxl

xi. (5)
The replicator dynamics rewards strategies that outper-
form the average by increasing their frequency, and pe-
nalizes poorly performing strategies by decreasing their
frequency. The stable fixed points of the replicator dy-
namics are Nash equilibria, it means that if a population
reaches a state which is a Nash equilibrium, it will re-
main there. It is important to note that the replicator
dynamics is a vectorial differential equation while von
Neumann equation can be represented in matrix form. If
we would like to compare both systems the first we would
have to do is to try to compare their evolution equations
by trying to find a matrix representation of the replicator
dynamics and this is
dX
dt
= G+GT , (6)
where the relative frequencies matrix X has as elements
xij = (xixj)
1/2 and
(
G+GT
)
ij
=
1
2
n∑
k=1
aikxkxij
+
1
2
n∑
k=1
ajkxkxji
−
n∑
k,l=1
aklxkxlxij (7)
are the elements of the matrix
(
G+GT
)
. Moreover, from
this matrix representation we can find a Lax representa-
tion of the replicator dynamics [1]
dX
dt
= [[Q,X ] , X ] (8)
and with Λ = [Q,X ]
dX
dt
= [Λ, X ] . (9)
The matrix Λ is equal to
(Λ)ij =
1
2
[(
n∑
k=1
aikxk
)
xij − xji
(
n∑
k=1
ajkxk
)]
(10)
and Q is a diagonal matrix which has as elements
qii =
1
2
∑n
k=1 aikxk. If we take Θ = [Λ, X ] equa-
tion (9) becomes into dXdt = Θ, where the elements of
the matrix Θ are given by (Θ)ij =
1
2
∑n
k=1 aikxkxij +
1
2
∑n
k=1 ajkxkxji −
∑n
k,l=1 alkxkxlxij . It is easy to re-
alize that the matrix commutative form of the replica-
tor dynamics (9) follows the same dynamic than the von
Neumann equation (1). It can be shown that the proper-
ties of their correspondent elements (matrixes) are sim-
ilar, being the properties corresponding to our quantum
system more general than the classical system.
C. Actual Relationships between
Quantum Mechanics & Game Theory
The following table shows some specific resemblances
between quantum statistical mechanics and evolutionary
game theory.
Table 2
Quantum Statistical Mechanics Evolutionary Game Theory
n system members n population members
Each member in the state |Ψk〉 Each member plays strategy si
|Ψk〉 with pk → ρij si → xi
ρ,
∑
i ρii= 1 X,
∑
i xi= 1
i~dρdt=
[
Hˆ, ρ
]
dX
dt = [Λ, X ]
S = −Tr {ρ ln ρ} H = −
∑
i xi lnxi
Although a physical system is modeled and described
mathematically through quantum mechanics while a so-
cioeconomical is modeled through game theory both sys-
tems seem to have a similar behavior. Both are composed
by n members (particles, subsystems, players, states,
etc.). Each member of our systems is described by a state
or a strategy which has assigned a determined probabil-
ity. The quantum mechanical system is described by a
density operator ρ whose elements represent the system
average probability of being in a determined state. The
socioeconomical system is described through a relative
frequencies matrix X whose elements represent the fre-
quency of players playing a determined strategy. The
evolution equation of the relative frequencies matrix X
(which describes our socioeconomical system) is given by
a Lax form of the replicator dynamics which was shown
that follows the same dynamic than the evolution equa-
tion of the density operator (i.e. the von Neumann equa-
tion).
4III. DIRECT CONSEQUENCES IN THE
ANALOGOUS BEHAVIOR OF QUANTUM
MECHANICS & GAME THEORY
A. Quantization Relationships
We can propose the next “quantization relationships”
xi →
n∑
k=1
〈i |Ψk 〉 pk 〈Ψk |i 〉 = ρii,
(xixj)
1/2 →
n∑
k=1
〈i |Ψk 〉 pk 〈Ψk |j 〉 = ρij . (11)
A population will be represented by a quantum system
in which each subpopulation playing strategy si will be
represented by a pure ensemble in the state |Ψk(t)〉 and
with probability pk. The probability xi of playing strat-
egy si or the relative frequency of the individuals using
strategy si in that population will be represented as the
probability ρii of finding each pure ensemble in the state
|i〉 [1].
B. Quantum Replicator Dynamics
Through the last quantization relationships the repli-
cator dynamics (in matrix commutative form) takes the
form of the equation of evolution of mixed states i.e. the
von Neumann equation is the quantum analogue of the
replicator dynamics. And also X −→ ρ, Λ −→ − i
~
Hˆ,
and H(x) −→ S(ρ) [1, 3].
C. Quantum Games Entropy
Classically, the entropy of our system is given by
H = −Tr {X lnX} . (12)
When the non diagonal elements of matrixX are equal to
zero it turns to the Shannon entropy over the elements of
the relative frequency vector x, i.e. H = −
∑n
i=1 xi lnxi.
By supposing that the vector of relative frequencies x(t)
evolves in time following the replicator dynamics (9) the
evolution of the entropy of our system would be given by
[3]
dH
dt
= Tr
{
U(H˜ −X)
}
, (13)
where Ui = [fi(x)− 〈f(x)〉], and H˜ comes from H =
TrH˜ .
The entropy of a quantum system is given by the von
Neumann entropy
S(t) = −Tr {ρ ln ρ} (14)
which in a far from equilibrium system also vary in time
until it reaches its maximum value. When the dynamics
is chaotic the variation with time of the physical entropy
goes through three successive, roughly separated stages
[25]. In the first one, S(t) is dependent on the details of
the dynamical system and of the initial distribution, and
no generic statement can be made. In the second stage,
S(t) is a linear increasing function of time (dSdt = const.).
In the third stage, S(t) tends asymptotically towards the
constant value which characterizes equilibrium (dSdt = 0).
With the purpose of calculating the time evolution of
entropy we approximated the logarithm of ρ by series i.e.
ln ρ = (ρ− I)− 1
2
(ρ− I)2 + 1
3
(ρ− I)3... and [3]
dS(t)
dt
=
11
6
∑
i
dρii
dt
−6
∑
i,j
ρij
dρji
dt
+
9
2
∑
i,j,k
ρijρjk
dρki
dt
−
4
3
∑
i,j,k,l
ρijρjkρkl
dρli
dt
+ ζ. (15)
D. Games Analysis from Quantum
Information Theory
If we define an Entropy [2, 3, 26–30] over a random
variable SA (player’s A strategic space) which can take
the values sAi with the respective probabilities x
A
i i.e.
H(A) ≡ −
∑n
i=1 xi log2 xi, we could interpret the entropy
of our game as a measure of uncertainty before we learn
what strategy player A is going to use [3]. If we do not
know what strategy a player is going to use every strategy
becomes equally probable and our uncertainty becomes
maximum and it is greater while greater is the number of
strategies. If we would know the relative frequency with
which playerA uses any strategy we can prepare our reply
in function of the most probable player A strategy. That
would be our actual best reply which in that moment
would let us maximize our payoff due to our uncertainty.
Obviously our uncertainty vanish if we are sure about
the strategy our opponent is going to use. The complete
knowledge of the rules of a game and the reserve in our
strategies becomes an advantage over an opponent who
does not know the game rules or who always plays in a
same predictive way. To become a game fair, an external
referee should make the players to know completely the
game rules and the strategies that the players can use.
If player B decides to play strategy sBj against player
A (who plays strategy sAi ) our total uncertainty about
the pair (A,B) can be measured by an external “ref-
eree” through the joint entropy of the system H(A,B) ≡
−
∑
i,j xij log2 xij , xij is the joint probability to find A
in state si and B in state sj . This is smaller or at least
5equal than the sum of the uncertainty about A and the
uncertainty about B, H(A,B) ≤ H(A) +H(B). The in-
teraction and the correlation between A and B reduces
the uncertainty due to the sharing of information. There
can be more predictability in the whole than in the sum
of the parts. The uncertainty decreases while more sys-
tems interact jointly creating a new only system.
We can measure how much information A and B share
and have an idea of how their strategies or states are
correlated by their mutual or correlation entropy H(A :
B) ≡ −
∑
i,j xij log2 xi:j , with xi:j =
∑
i
xij
∑
j
xij
xij
. It can
be seen easily as H(A : B) ≡ H(A) +H(B) −H(A,B).
The joint entropy would equal the sum of each of A’s
and B’s entropies only in the case that there are no cor-
relations between A’s and B’s states. In that case, the
mutual entropy vanishes and we could not make any pre-
dictions about A just from knowing something about B.
If we know that B decides to play strategy sBj we
can determinate the uncertainty about A through the
conditional entropy H(A | B) ≡ H(A,B) − H(B) =
−
∑
i,j xij log2 xi|j with xi|j =
xij∑
i xij
. If this uncertainty
is bigger or equal to zero then the uncertainty about
the whole is smaller or at least equal than the uncer-
tainty about A, i.e. H(A : B) ≤ H(A). Our uncer-
tainty about the decisions of player A knowing how B
and C plays is smaller or at least equal than our un-
certainty about the decisions of A knowing only how
B plays H(A | B,C) ≤ H(A | B) i.e. conditioning
reduces entropy. If the behavior of the players of a
game follows a Markov chain i.e. A → B → C then
H(A) ≥ H(A : B) ≥ H(A : C) i.e. the information
can only reduces in time. Also any information C shares
with A must be information which C also shares with B,
H(C : B) ≥ H(C : A).
Two external observers of the same game can mea-
sure the difference in their perceptions about certain
strategy space of the same player A by its relative en-
tropy. Each of them could define a relative frequency
vector, x and y, and the relative entropy over these
two probability distributions is a measure of its closeness
H(x ‖ y) ≡
∑
i xi log2 xi −
∑
i xi log2 yi. We could also
suppose that A could be in two possible states i.e. we
know that A can play of two specific but different ways
and each way has its probability distribution (again x
and y that also is known). Suppose that this situation is
repeated exactly N times or by N people. We can made
certain “measure”, experiment or “trick” to determine
which the state of the player is. The probability that
these two states can be confused is given by the classical
or the quantum Sanov’s theorem [27, 31–33].
By analogy with the Shannon entropies it is possible
to define conditional, mutual and relative quantum en-
tropies which also satisfy many other interesting prop-
erties that do not satisfy their classical analogues. For
example, the conditional entropy S(A | B) can be nega-
tive and its negativity always indicates that two systems
(in this case players) are entangled and indeed, how neg-
ative the conditional entropy is provides a lower bound
on how entangled the two systems are [34]. If λi are
the eigenvalues of ρ then von Neumann’s definition can
be expressed as S(λ) = −
∑
i λi lnλi and it reduces to
a Shannon entropy if ρ is a mixed state composed of or-
thogonal quantum states [35]. Our uncertainty about the
mixture of states S(
∑
i piρi) should be higher than the
average uncertainty of the states
∑
i piS(ρi).
E. Thermodynamical Temperature
of a Socioeconomical System
By other hand, in statistical mechanics entropy can
be regarded as a quantitative measure of disorder. It
takes its maximum possible value lnn in a completely
random ensemble in which all quantum mechanical states
are equally likely and is equal to zero if ρ is pure i.e. when
all its members are characterized by the same quantum
mechanical state ket. Entropy can be maximized subject
to different constraints. Generally, the result is a prob-
ability distribution function. We maximize S(ρ) subject
to the constraints δT r (ρ) = 0 and δ 〈E〉 = 0 and the
result is
ρii =
e−βEi∑
k e
−βEk
(16)
which is the condition that the density operator must sat-
isfy to our system tends to maximize its entropy S. With-
out the internal energy constraint δ 〈E〉 = 0 we obtain
ρii =
1
N which is the β → 0 limit (“high - temperature
limit”) in equation (16) in where a canonical ensemble
becomes a completely random ensemble in which all en-
ergy eigenstates are equally populated. In the opposite
low - temperature limit β → ∞ tell us that a canonical
ensemble becomes a pure ensemble where only the ground
state is populated [36]. The parameter β is related in-
versely to the “temperature” τ of the system, β = 1τ . We
can rewrite entropy in function of the partition function
Z =
∑
k e
−βEk , β and 〈E〉 via S = lnZ + β 〈E〉. From
the partition function we can know some parameters that
define the system like 〈E〉 and
〈
∆E2
〉
. We can also ana-
lyze the variation of entropy with respect to the average
energy of the system
∂S
∂ 〈E〉
=
1
τ
, (17)
∂2S
∂ 〈E〉
2
= −
1
τ2
∂τ
∂ 〈E〉
(18)
and with respect to the parameter β
∂S
∂β
= −β
〈
∆E2
〉
, (19)
∂2S
∂β2
=
∂ 〈E〉
∂β
+ β
∂2 〈E〉
∂β2
. (20)
6F. The Applicability of Physics to Economics
Although both systems analyzed are described through
two theories apparently different both are analogous and
thus exactly equivalents. So, we could make use of some
of the concepts, laws and definitions in physics for the
best understanding of the behavior of economics and bi-
ology. Quantum mechanics could be a much more general
theory that we had thought. It could encloses theories
like games and evolutionary dynamics. From this point
of view many of the equations, concepts and its prop-
erties defined quantically must be more general that its
classical analogues.
It is important to remember that we are dealing with
very general and unspecific terms, definitions, and con-
cepts like state, game and system. Due to this, the the-
ories that have been developed around these terms like
quantum mechanics, statistical physics, information the-
ories and game theories enjoy of this generality quality
and could be applicable to model any system depending
on what we want to mean for game, state, or system.
Objectively these words can be and represent anything.
Once we have defined what system is in our model, we
could try to understand what kind of “game” is devel-
oping between its members and how they accommodate
their “states” in order to get their objectives. This would
let us visualize what temperature, energy and entropy
would represent in our specific system through the rela-
tionships, properties and laws that were defined before
when we described a physical system [4–6].
G. The Collective Welfare Principle & the
Quantum Understanding of Classical Systems
If our systems are analogous and thus exactly equiv-
alents, our physical equilibrium (maximum entropy)
should be also exactly equivalent to our socioeconomi-
cal equilibrium (NE or ESS). And if the natural trend of
a physical system is to a maximum entropy state, should
not a socioeconomical system trend be also to a maxi-
mum entropy state which would have to be its state of
equilibrium? Has a socioeconomical system something
like a “natural trend”?
Based specially on the analogous behavior between
quantum mechanics and game theory, it is suggested
the following (quantum) understanding of our (classical
and/or socioeconomical) system: If in an isolated sys-
tem each of its accessible states do not have the same
probability, the system is not in equilibrium. The sys-
tem will vary and will evolve in time until it reaches the
equilibrium state in where the probability of finding the
system in each of the accessible states is the same. The
system will find its more probable configuration in which
the number of accessible states is maximum and equally
probable. The whole system will vary and rearrange its
state and the states of its ensembles with the purpose
of maximize its entropy and reach its equilibrium state.
We could say that the purpose and maximum payoff of a
physical system is its maximum entropy state. The sys-
tem and its members will vary and rearrange themselves
to reach the best possible state for each of them which is
also the best possible state for the whole system.
This can be seen like a microscopical cooperation be-
tween quantum objects to improve their states with the
purpose of reaching or maintaining the equilibrium of
the system. All the members of our quantum system will
play a game in which its maximum payoff is the equilib-
rium of the system. The members of the system act as a
whole besides individuals like they obey a rule in where
they prefer the welfare of the collective over the welfare
of the individual. This equilibrium is represented in the
maximum entropy of the system in where the system
resources are fairly distributed over its members. The
system is stable only if it maximizes the welfare of the
collective above the welfare of the individual. If it is max-
imized the welfare of the individual above the welfare of
the collective the system gets unstable and eventually it
collapses (Collective Welfare Principle) [1, 3–7].
IV. THE EQUILIBRIUM PROCESS CALLED
GLOBALIZATION
Lets discuss how the world process that it is called
“globalization” has a behavior exactly equivalent to a
system that is tending to a maximum entropy state.
A. Globalization
Globalization represents the inexorable integration of
markets, nation-states, currencies, technologies [37] and
the intensification of consciousness of the world as a
whole [38]. This refers to an increasing global connec-
tivity, integration and interdependence in the economic,
social, technological, cultural, political, and ecological
spheres [39]. Globalization has various aspects which af-
fect the world in several different ways such as [39] the
emergence of worldwide production markets and broader
access to a range of goods for consumers and compa-
nies (industrial), the emergence of worldwide financial
markets and better access to external financing for cor-
porate, national and subnational borrowers (financial),
the realization of a global common market, based on the
freedom of exchange of goods and capital (economical),
the creation of a world government which regulates the
relationships among nations and guarantees the rights
arising from social and economic globalization (politi-
cal) [40], the increase in information flows between geo-
graphically remote locations (informational), the growth
of cross-cultural contacts (cultural), the advent of global
environmental challenges that can not be solved with-
out international cooperation, such as climate change,
cross-boundary water and air pollution, over-fishing of
the ocean, and the spread of invasive species (ecological)
7and the achievement of free circulation by people of all
nations (social).
1. Economical Globalization
In economics, globalization is the convergence of prices,
products, wages, rates of interest and profits towards de-
veloped country norms [41]. Globalization of the econ-
omy depends on the role of human migration, interna-
tional trade, movement of capital, and integration of fi-
nancial markets. Economic globalization can be mea-
sured around the four main economic flows that charac-
terize globalization such as goods and services (e.g. ex-
ports plus imports as a proportion of national income or
per capita of population), labor/people (e.g. net migra-
tion rates; inward or outward migration flows, weighted
by population), capital (e.g. inward or outward direct in-
vestment as a proportion of national income or per head
of population), and technology. To what extent a nation-
state or culture is globalized in a particular year has until
most recently been measured employing simple proxies
like flows of trade, migration, or foreign direct invest-
ment, as described above. A multivariate approach to
measuring globalization is the recent index calculated by
the Swiss Think tank KOF [42]. The index measures the
three main dimensions of globalization: economic, social,
and political.
2. Big Communities & Strong Currencies
Maybe the firsts of these so called states-nations, com-
munities, “unions”, common markets, etc. were the
Unites States of America and the USSR (now the Russian
Federation). Both consists in a set or group of different
nations or states under the same basic laws or princi-
ples (constitution), policies, objectives and an economy
characterized by a same currency. Although each state or
nation is a part of a big community each of them can take
its own decisions and choose its own way of government,
policies, laws and punishments (e.g. death penalty) but
subject to a constitution (which is no more than a “com-
mon agreement”) and also subject to the decisions of the
“congress” of the community which regulates the whole
and the decisions of the parts. The United States of
America consists in 50 states and a federal district. It
also has many dependent territories located in the An-
tilles and Oceania. The currency in The United States
is the Dollar. The Russian Federation consists in a big
number of political subdivisions (88 components). There
are 21 republics inside the federation with a big degree of
autonomy over most of the aspects. The rest of territory
consists in 48 provinces known as o´blast and six regions
(kray), between which there are 10 autonomic districts
and an autonomic o´blast and 2 federal cities (Moscow
and San Petersburg). Recently, seven federal districts
have been added. The currency in Russia is the Rublo
[39].
The European Union stands as an example that the
world should emulate by its sharing rights, responsibil-
ities, and values, including the obligation to help the
less fortunate. The most fundamental of these values
is democracy, understood to entail not merely periodic
elections, but also active and meaningful participation in
decision making, which requires an engaged civil society,
strong freedom of information norms, and a vibrant and
diversified media that are not controlled by the state or
a few oligarchs. The second value is social justice. An
economic and political system is to be judged by the ex-
tent to which individuals are able to flourish and real-
ize their potential. As individuals, they are part of an
ever-widening circle of communities, and they can real-
ize their potential only if they live in harmony with each
other. This, in turn, requires a sense of responsibility
and solidarity [43].
The meeting of 16 national leaders at the second East
Asia Summit (EAS) on the Philippine island of Cebu in
January 2007 offered the promise of the politically frac-
tious but economically powerful Asian mega-region one
day coalescing into a single meaningful unit [44].
Seth Kaplan has offered the innovative idea of a West
African Union (the 15 West African countries stretching
from Senegal to Nigeria) to help solve West Africa’s deep-
rooted problems [45].
In South America has been proposed the creation of
a Latin-American Community which is an offer for the
integration, the struggle against the poverty and the so-
cial exclusion of the countries of Latin-America. It is
based on the creation of mechanisms to create cooper-
ative advantages between countries that let balance the
asymmetries between the countries of the hemisphere and
the cooperation of funds to correct the inequalities of the
weak countries against the powerful nations. The econ-
omy ministers of Paraguay, Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador,
Venezuela and Bolivia agreed in the “Declaracio´n de
Asuncio´n” to create the Bank of the South and invite
the rest of countries to add to this project. The Brazilian
economy minister Mantega stand out that the new bank
is going to consolidate the economic, social and politic
block that is appearing in South America and now they
have to point to the creation of a common currency. Re-
cently, Uruguay has also accepted the offer of the creation
of the bank and the common currency and is expected
that more countries add to this offer [46].
B. The Equilibrium Process
After analyzing our systems we concluded that a so-
cioeconomical system has a behavior exactly equivalent
that a physical system. Both systems evolve in analo-
gous ways and to analogous states. A system where its
members are in Nash Equilibrium (or ESS) is exactly
equivalent to a system in a maximum entropy state. The
stability of the system is based on the maximization of
8the welfare of the collective above the welfare of the in-
dividual. The natural trend of a physical system is to
a maximum entropy state, should not a socioeconomical
system trend be also to a maximum entropy state which
would have to be its state of equilibrium? Has a socioe-
conomical system something like a “natural trend”?
From our analysis a population can be represented by
a quantum system in which each subpopulation playing
strategy si will be represented by a pure ensemble in the
state |Ψk(t)〉 and with probability pk. The probability
xi of playing strategy si or the relative frequency of the
individuals using strategy si in that population will be
represented as the probability ρii of finding each pure
ensemble in the state |i〉. Through these quantization
relationships the replicator dynamics (in matrix commu-
tative form) takes the form of the equation of evolution
of mixed states i.e. the von Neumann equation is the
quantum analogue of the replicator dynamics.
Our now “quantum statistical” system composed by
quantum objects represented by quantum states which
represent the strategies with which “players” interact is
characterized by certain interesting physical parameters
like temperature, entropy and energy and has a similar
or analogous behavior.
In this statistical mixture of ensembles (each ensemble
is characterized by a state and each state has assigned a
determined probability) its natural trend is to its max-
imum entropy state. If each of its accessible states do
not have the same probability, the system will vary and
will evolve in time until it reaches the equilibrium state
in where the probability of finding the system in each of
the accessible states is the same and its number is max-
imum. In this equilibrium state or maximum entropy
state the system “resources” are fairly distributed over
its members. Each ensemble will be equally probable,
will be characterized by a same temperature and in a
stable state.
Socioeconomically and based on our analysis, our
world could be understood as a statistical mixture of “en-
sembles” (countries for example). Each of these ensem-
bles are characterized by a determined state and a deter-
mined probability. But more important, each “country”
is characterized by a specific “temperature” which is a
measure of the socioeconomical activity of that ensem-
ble. That temperature is related with the activity or with
the interactions between the members of the ensemble.
The system will evolve naturally to a maximum entropy
state. Each pure ensemble of this statistical mixture will
vary and accommodate its state until get the “thermal
equilibrium” first with its nearest neighbors creating new
big ensembles characterized each of them by a same tem-
perature. Then with the time, these new big ensembles
will seek its “thermal equilibrium” between themselves
and with its nearest neighbors creating new bigger en-
sembles. The system will continue evolving naturally in
time until the whole system get an only state character-
ized by a same “temperature”.
This behavior is very similar to what has been called
globalization. The process of equilibrium that is abso-
lutely equivalent to a system that is tending to a maxi-
mum entropy state is the actual globalization. This anal-
ysis predicts the apparition of big common “markets” or
(economical, political, social, etc.) communities of coun-
tries (European Union, Asian Union, Latin-American
Community, African Union, Mideast Community, Russia
and USA) and strong common currencies (dollar, euro,
yen, sol, etc.). The little and poor economies eventually
will be unavoidably absorbed by these “markets” and
these currencies. If this process continues these markets
or communities will find its “equilibrium” by decreasing
its number until reach a state in where there exists only
one big common community (or market) and only one
common currency around the world.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Although both systems analyzed are described through
two theories apparently different (quantum mechanics
and game theory) both are analogous and thus exactly
equivalents. A socioeconomical system has a behavior
exactly equivalent that a physical system. Both systems
evolve in analogous ways and to analogous points. The
quantum analogue of the replicator dynamics is the von
Neumann equation. A system where its members are in
Nash Equilibrium (or ESS) is exactly equivalent to a sys-
tem in a maximum entropy state. The natural trend of
both systems is to its maximum entropy state which is
its state of equilibrium.
The so called “globalization” process (i.e. the inex-
orable integration of markets, currencies, nation-states,
technologies and the intensification of consciousness of
the world as a whole) has a behavior exactly equivalent
to a system that is tending to a maximum entropy state.
This globalization process obeys a collective welfare prin-
ciple in where the maximum payoff is given by the equilib-
rium of the system and its stability by the maximization
of the welfare of the collective over the individual welfare.
This let us predict the apparition of big common markets
and strong common currencies that will reach the “equi-
librium” by decreasing its number until they get a state
characterized by only one common currency and only one
big common community around the world.
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